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This paper examines a static voting model for public pensions. The key premise is that 
families can internalize the cost and benefits of pay-as-you-go programs. A family realizes a 
net gain if its members collectively receive more in benefits in the current period than they 
pay in payroll taxes. Abstracting from differences in income, net benefits are positive if the 
family’s retiree-worker ratio exceeds the national average. If a sufficient fraction of retirees 
have a suitable number of working-age relatives—not too few and not too many—then a 
majority of voters belongs to families with above average retiree-worker ratios. 
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1. Introduction 
Public pensions and other pay-as-you-go financed retirement benefits enjoy strong popular support 
despite the escalating cost.1 This is remarkable from the perspective of voting theory because retiree 
benefits redistribute resources from a majority of working-age voters to a minority of retirees. 
Following Aaron (1966) and Browning (1975), a large literature has examined intertemporal models 
for voting on social security—the notion that contributors may vote in favor because they expect 
benefits in the future—to explain this puzzle.2 Others have appealed to income redistribution and 
altruism (e.g., Tabellini 2000). 
   This paper presents an alternative voting model based on intra-family bargaining. The key 
premise is that families can internalize the cost and benefits of retiree benefit programs. A family 
realizes a net gain from a pay-as-you-go program if its members collectively receive more in benefits 
that they pay in payroll taxes. Net benefits are positive if a family’s share of retirees exceeds the 
national average. Preferences over tax rates and benefit levels are single peaked in families’ retiree 
shares. 
  Retiree benefits are positive in a voting equilibrium if the majority of the population is in 
families with above average retiree-worker ratios. This condition is plausibly satisfied if most families 
include a positive, but not too high number of intergenerational linkages. A supporting factor is that if 
mortality is stochastic, only the survivors vote. For any given structure of family linkages, families 
with surviving retirees have more members than families with higher mortality.3 The conditions for 
majority support are likely violated, however, in societies with substantial heterogeneity over family 
linkages, e.g., if most families are have either many children or no children. 
                                                      
1 In the following, I use the term social security to represent a generic pay-as-you-program. The model applies to pensions 
and to other benefit programs, such as retiree health care. 
2 A challenge in dynamic models is to establish a link between current voting and future benefits. The early literature ignored 
repeated voting. More recently, Cooley and Soarez (1999) have modeled repeated voting with trigger strategy arguments to 
tie current votes to future benefits. Applications include my own work (Bohn 1999, 2005) and Galasso (2006). 
3 With survival uncertainty, retiree benefits can be interpreted as mutual insurance against uncertainty about a needy 
relative’s longevity. A difficulty with this insurance is that ex post, voters whose relatives have died early have an incentive 
renege. The conditions for majority support for social security can conditions may be viewed as conditions for the political 
sustainability of survival insurance. 2 
  As a technical device to obtain interior solutions for tax rates, I assume payroll taxes distort 
labor supply. (This avoids extreme shifts between zero taxes and confiscatory taxes in response to 
small changes in population structure.) Preferences over payroll taxes are then single-peaked as 
function of families’ retiree shares, or equivalently, retiree-worker ratios. In the voting equilibrium, 
payroll taxes are set so that the marginal excess burden of taxes equals the net financial benefit for the 
median family.  
  The model disregards all dynamic voting considerations and assumes working-age voters treat 
their own future benefits as unrelated to their votes over current benefits.4 I also disregard altruism and 
income heterogeneity. This is for clarity, to limit the scope of the paper, and to avoid any bias for 
social security due to altruistic and redistribution features. One may suspect that the remarkable 
popularity of public retirement and old-age health programs around the world is based on multiple 
factors. This may include dynamic arguments, altruism, and redistribution across heterogeneous 
incomes. While it would be straightforward to combine such arguments with the mechanism proposed 
here, the resulting “combination” models would be unwieldy and they would obscure the conditions 
under which family bargaining per se is supportive of social security. That is, I view the family 
bargaining mechanism as complementary with other arguments for social security.5  
  Breyer and v.d. Schulenburg (1987) were the first to propose families as relevant decision 
units for voting on social security. In contrast to this paper, Breyer and v.d. Schulenburg treat a vote 
on social security as a once-and-for-all decision and they follow the dynamic literature in assuming 
that voters base their decisions on a present value of current and expected future taxes and benefits. 
They also make specific assumptions about family structure, namely that voting-age individuals care 
about the net taxes of their direct descendents (children, grandchildren, etc.), assuming asexual 
reproduction (each child having a single parent).  
                                                      
4 This is not to deny the relevance of promised future benefits in practice, but to meet the challenge of constructing voter 
support in a static model—a model that allows repeated voting without requiring trigger strategy arguments. Put differently, I 
set aside the intertemporal linkages that the dynamic literature works so hard to establish and instead take seriously the 
simple, non-trigger strategy solution that always exists in trigger strategy models.  
5 Understanding all the reasons why voters support social security is important in part because reform efforts are likely to fail 
unless they attract majority support. The history of failed reforms in Europe and in the U.S. suggests a need for better 
understanding.  3 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant demographic facts. Section 3 
presents the model. Section 4 examines voting behavior and presents the main propositions. Section 5 
provides numerical examples. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Demographics of Families 
The share of retirees in the voting population is around 20% in the U.S. and in the 25-35% range in 
continental Europe. Thus retirees are a strong minority, but far from a majority even in European 
countries with below-replacement fertility.  
  The effective retirement age is about 63 in the U.S. and around 60 in Europe. Life expectancy 
at age 60 is about 20 years—more for females and somewhat less for males. This is well over half of 
the average time span between generations. Using U.S. life tables, one also finds that for a child of 25-
year old parents, with about 60% probability at least one of the parents reaches age 85. The probability 
rises to 65% conditional on both reaching age 60. This means that a large majority of working-age 
voters has living parents. For older workers, these parents are likely retired. For children and younger 
workers, the same argument suggests that a majority will have retired grandparents or grand-
grandparents. Thus a large majority of the population has close relatives who benefit from pay-as-you-
go public pensions and other retiree benefits (e.g. health care). 
  Most children are born to mothers age 20-35, with a peak around age 25-30. Hence retirees at, 
say, age 80 will likely have children in the age range 50-55 and grandchildren in the age range 20-30. 
This suggests that the voting population encompasses more than two generations and would not 
captured adequately by modeling a nuclear family.6 For this reason, I treat a family as an abstract 
collection of voters, i.e., without trying to identify specific kinship relations as necessarily more or less 
relevant than others.  
  My basic premise is that family linkages may matter for voting. Importantly, the argument 
does not require altruism towards retired relatives, but merely an ability to align members’ voting 
incentives. For example, a college student with retired grandparents that are supported by his parents 
                                                      
6 The longer time spent in working age than in retirement also explains why retirees remain a minority even in countries with 
fertility below replacement. 4 
might vote against cuts in public pensions because such cuts might trigger a shift in parental support 
from the student to the grandparents, or perhaps reduced gifts and bequests. In this context, gifts, 
bequests, and other intra-family payments are not necessarily evidence of altruism, but may reflect 
Coase-type “side payments” designed to ensure cooperation in voting. 
3. The Model  
Consider an economy with finitely lived individuals.  Time is indexed by time t, and age is indexed by 
a. Both are treated as discrete. Individuals born at time t form cohort t. They are eligible to vote age 
a=V≥0, they become eligible for retirement benefits at age a=R, where R>V, and they live up to a 
terminal age a=A≥R. The labor force consists all non-retired voters, the age range a∈[V,R-1]. Let πa 
be the survival function; that is, generation-t individuals survive to (at least) age a with probability πa, 
where πa>0 for a≤A, declining in a, and πA+1=0. Assuming children neither vote nor work, they can be 
disregarded (their consumption subsumed under their parents consumption); hence V=0 is without loss 
of generality. Then cohort t is economically active in [t, t+A]; and at time t, the living cohorts are those 
born in [t, t-A].  
  The economy is deterministic except for stochastic mortality. Labor has an exogenous 
marginal product of labor w and savings earn an exogenous real interest r.  (Time variation could be 
added but would just clutter the notation.) The common wage rate serves to emphasize that the model 
does not rely on intra-cohort redistribution or on a particular income distribution. At age a0, 
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a . I abstract from altruism to emphasize that altruism is 
not essential for the proposed model of social security.  
  Retiree benefits are structured to pose a one-dimensional voting problem: The retirement age 
R is exogenous. Individual at ages a<R (workers) pay proportional payroll taxes at rate ττ. Retirees 
(ages a≥R) receive transfers Tt. Labor supply lt
a =1− λt
a is endogenous for workers (a<R); lt
a = 0 is 
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a)), where u and φ are increasing 
and concave. Then labor supply for all a<R is characterized by φ'(λt
a) = w(1−τt) and can be written 
as a declining function of the current tax rate, lt
a = L(τt). Assume φ has a shape such that tax 
revenues  τL(τ) are strictly increasing and strictly concave in τ up to an interior maximum at some 
value τmax <1. (That is, I assume Harberger triangle and Laffer curve intuition applies. This simple 
treatment of leisure suffices because the tax distortions only serve as device to avoid extreme solutions 
to the voting problem.) Then τmax satisfies L(τmax)−τL'(τmax) = 0; and L(τ)−τL'(τ) is positive 
and strictly decreasing τ in for τ < τmax. 
 Let  Nt
a denote the number of individuals of age a living in period t. Then   
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are the working-age population, the retired population, and the per-worker labor supply, respectively. 
are the working-age population and the retired population, respectively. Let denote per worker labor 
supply at time t.7 
  Assuming taxes and transfers are administered pay-as-you-go, the government’s budget 
constraint is TtN  t
R = τtN  t
WwL(τt). Every period, the tax rate τ t is determined by voting decisions, 
assuming voters understand that transfers Tt = τtL(τt)w⋅ N  t
W /N  t
R depend on the tax rate τt and on 
the aggregate worker-retiree ratio. 
  Retiree preferences over τt are strictly increasing in τt whereas worker preferences are strictly 
decreasing in τt, i.e., both are single peaked. If there are more workers than retirees, N  t
W > N  t
R, the 
unique equilibrium with individualistic voting would be τt=0.8 This insight generates the basic puzzle 
of social security in a democracy: With a majority of voters in working-age, how can one explain the 
existence of social security? 
                                                      
7 If ϕa denotes the fraction of age-a individuals having a child (fertility), the population dynamics can be described by 
Nt+1
a+1 = Nt




A ∑ . The dynamics are inessential, however. 
8 In the empirically unrealistic case N  t
W < N  t
R, one would obtain τt=τ
max. 6 
  The economic literature on social security has tried to resolve the puzzle in various directions, 
notably by considering dynamic/intertemporal arguments (reputation, generational contracts, trigger 
strategies), altruism, linkages between intra- and inter-generational redistribution, public choice 
arguments (the old having more time to lobby), or combinations thereof. For clarity, none of these 
assumptions is invoked here. 
4. Family Preferences 
The defining feature of a family for the purposes of this paper is the ability to internalize the cost and 
benefits of government programs that accrue to its members. That is, a family is any collection of 
individuals with the ability to coordinate its actions in a way that attains the Pareto frontier of its 
members’ utilities.  
  Families may include direct child-parent-grandparent linkages, higher-order kinship relations 
(e.g. nephews, uncles), or linkages by marriage. I do not apply specific labels to relationships to avoid 
ad hoc assumptions about which linkages matter and to keep the notation simple.  
  Let the economy’s population be partitioned into families and consider the Pareto problem of a 
generic family with nat members of age a and nt = nt
a
a=0
A ∑  total members. Pareto-optimal family 
allocations can be obtain by maximizing a weighted average of member utilities,  






for some collection of weights ωa>0. With or without intertemporal commitments, the period-t 
decision problem reduces to maximizing  






















for any given level of family savings St.   Because problem is static, time subscripts are dropped in the 
following.  
  While the resulting intra-family allocation of consumption depends on the welfare weights, the 
conclusions about voting do not, nor do they depend on family wealth or on decisions about savings. 7 
To see this, differentiate W with respect to τ (noting that effects on leisure and on savings cancel out 

















where Φ>0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the period-t resource constraint. 
 Note  that  1−λt













W)∈(0,1) denotes the aggregate population share of retirees. Similarly, let 
η= nt
a /nt a=R
A ∑ ∈ [0,1] denote the family’s own share of retirees. Then  a  family’s  optimality 















⎥ = 0, (1) 
where the second equality must hold at interior solutions. (For η<1, η/(1−η) can be interpreted as 
the retiree-worker ratio, a more commonly used variable. I use the retiree-share for the analysis 
because the retiree share is finite and bounded even for families without workers, for which there is no 
finite retiree-worker ratio.)  
 Noting  that  ∂W /∂τ is increasing inη , one finds:   
 
Proposition 1: Family preferences over payroll taxes are a single-peaked function of the retiree share. 
The preferred values satisfy τ *(η) = 0 for families with η ≤ η ; τ *(η) ∈ (0,τmax) for η < η < 1 
with τ *(η) strictly increasing in η; and τ *(η) =τmax for η = 1. 







. For η =1,  τ* this reduces to L(τ)+τL'(τ) =0, which means 
τ*=τmax. For η =η <1, the condition reduces to L'(τ) =0, which implies τ*= 0. Because 






∈ (0,1), where the r.h.s. is decreases strictly in η. Because the l.h.s. is 
strictly decreasing in τ, the preferred value is unique and increasing in η. For all η, preferences are 
single peaked because ∂W /∂τ  changes sign only once, from positive to negative at τ*. QED.  
 8 
Proposition 1 implies that family preferences are also single peaked in the family’s retiree-worker 
ratio.  
  The economic intuition why only the retiree share matters is based on Coasian reasoning. In 
countries where retirees are not entitled to family support, retirees may have to make side-payments to 
induce working-age relatives to endorse positive payroll taxes. In countries where children are obliged 
to support needy parents (by law or perhaps by custom), no side payments may be needed, or 
payments may go from working-age to retired members.9 
  In the limiting case of (almost) inelastic labor supply, L'(τ) →0 would imply τmax →1 and 
τ *(η) →1 for all η >η . That is, preferred tax rates would diverge to the extremes of the unit 
interval. The assumption of quasi-linear preferences over leisure is meant as a smoothing device, to 
rule out such extreme solutions and to ensure continuous preferences over the size of the social 
security system. 
  To define a voting equilibrium, let individuals be sorted by the retiree shares of the families 
they belong to. Let F(η) denote the resulting cumulative distribution function of voters. That is, in a 
multi-person families, the family’s η value is counted as many times as the family has members. 
Single, unattached workers and retirees are interpreted as families of size one with retiree shares η=0 
and η=1, respectively. Let ηmed = F-1(1/2) denote the retiree share of the median voter’s family. Then: 
 
Proposition 2:  
(a)  A unique voting equilibrium exists and is given by τ* = τ *( ηmed ).  
(b)  The equilibrium payroll tax rate τ * is strictly positive if and only if ηmed >η .  
Proof: Follows from Prop.1 and the definition of  ηmed. QED. 
 
                                                      
9 Note that ∂W /∂τ  does not depend on welfare weights. The irrelevance of welfare weights also implies that the sign of 
∂W /∂τ  would remain unchanged if individuals had preferences that put positive weight on their relatives’ 
Ut
a0 functions. It would be straightforward to include this type of altruism formally, but requiring tedious notation and 
regularity conditions. Altruism would influence the amount and direction of side-payments. 9 
  The key condition for the existence of social security is that the majority of the population 
lives in families with retiree share greater than the aggregate retiree share; or equivalently, that the 
majority lives in families with retiree-worker ratios greater than the aggregate retiree-worker ratio.  
5. Examples 
A natural next question is which assumptions about demographics are likely to satisfy the condition 
ηmed >η . A study of the empirical distribution of family sizes is beyond the scope of this paper, and 
it may not be persuasive anyway because one would have to make ad hoc assumptions about the 
strengths of various linkages. Hence I focus on examples that illustrate the basic forces driving the 
voting outcomes. 
 
Example #1 [Two point distribution] 
Suppose a fraction f of working-age individuals forms lasting bonds with m>0 family members who 
will be voting age when the person is in retirement—called intergenerational bonds in the following. 
Natural examples would be bonds with children—some or all—but the bonds could be with other 
younger relatives like grandchildren, nieces or nephews, or in-laws. Assume a fraction πR ∈ (0,1] of 
the working-age population lives to the maximum age A, and fraction 1-πR dies at the retirement age 
R. Let  ˆ  η =η /πR be the hypothetical retired population if all retirees had survived, expressed as share 
of actual population. Assume retirees are not linked to each other and that each working-age voter is 
linked to at most one retiree. Then f and m are bounded by  fm ≤ (1−η )/ˆ  η , or  fm ≤ πR(1−η )/η . 
Also, assume η <1/2 so retirees are a minority.  
  The example economy has three types of families. Retirees without intergenerational bonds 
form single-member families; they account for share πR ˆ  η  (1− f ) =η (1− f ) of the population. A 
fraction f of retirees lives in families consisting of the retiree plus m workers. Such families have 
retiree share η=1/(1+m)>0 and their population share is πR(1+ m)ˆ  η  f = (1+ m)η f . Finally, families 
have workers and no retirees, either because the workers never bonded with a retiree (population share 
1−η − fm ˆ  η ) or because the retired member has died (population share (1−πR)fm ˆ  η ). The first type 10 
prefers  τ *( 1 )= τmax but is a minority. The second type prefers τ *(η) > 0 if and only if 
η =1/(1+ m) >η . The third type prefers τ *(0)=0 and constitutes a majority if and only if 
  F(0) =1−η − fm ˆ  η + (1−πR)fm ˆ  η =1−η − fmη >1/2.10 
With this population structure, social security taxes are positive if and only if 
  (A) the median voter’s family is a family of retirees with workers: 1−η − fmη <1/2; and  
  (B) this type of family prefers positive taxes: 1/(1+ m) >η . 
  Condition (A) imposes a lower bound on the number of workers linked to retirees, 
fm > (1/2 −η )/η . Because  fm ≤ πR(1−η )/η , (A) also requires a sufficiently high survival rate, 
namely πR > (1/2 −η )/( 1−η ). Condition (B) imposes an upper bound on the number of workers in 
each worker-retiree family, m < (1−η )/η . For η <1/2, the interval [(1/2−η )/η ,(1−η )/η ] has a 
length exceeding one and therefore includes one or more integers m. For integers m in this interval, 
(A) holds if πR is sufficiently close to one, and (B) holds if f is sufficiently close to one. Thus, voting 
solutions with positive taxes do exist.  
  Quantitatively, retiree shares in developed countries are in the 0.2 to 0.35 range. Consider 
η =0.3 as specific example. One obtains (1−η )/η = 7/3 and (1/2 −η )/η = 2/3. Hence conditions 
(A) and (B) are satisfied for m=1 with f>2/3 and for m=2 with f>1/3. That is, family linkages support 
social security if there are a sufficient number of “small” families—either at least 2/3 of retirees in 
families with one working-age member or at least 1/3 of retirees in families with exactly two working-
age members. Social security does not have majority support if either too few retirees have 
intergenerational bonds, or if retirees with intergenerational bonds are linked to too many workers.  
  Table 1 displays, for a range of retiree shares, combinations of family sizes (m), minimal 
survival rates (πR), and minimal frequency of family bonds (f) that support social security. For retiree-
shares in the over-1/4 to near-1/2 range, a significant fraction of one-worker-one-retiree linkages 
suffices, or a smaller number of multiple linkages. When retiree shares are lower, social security 
requires a larger number of family linkages (higher m) to bind a sufficient number of workers into 
                                                      
10 Throughout, I disregard the case of  tied, 50:50 voters, because they would distract from substantive insights and because 
such cases are non-generic in the parameter spaces considered. 11 
families with retirees. In addition, the number of links must not be too high because a family with too 
many workers would have a retiree share below the national average and prefer zero taxes. 
  Note that a survival probability of less than ½ suffices in all cases. Because the survivor 
him/herself can vote, families with retirees can have a majority of votes even if retirees have died in a 
majority of families. If social security is interpreted as insurance against the cost of supporting family 
members who survive into retirement, Table 1 can be interpreted as providing conditions under which 
families with early deaths cannot renege on their insurance payments. 
   Overall, Table 1 suggests that family support for social security requires a balance between 
retiree shares and family sizes. Societies with high fertility rates tend to have large families and low 
retiree shares. In such societies, static support for social security requires that most retiree are linked to 
a substantial number of working-age family members. In societies with low fertility, where families 
tend to be small and retiree shares high, support for social security requires appropriately smaller 
number and/or frequency of family bonds. Prior to the demographic transition, survival rates into 
retirement were probably too low to support social security even with large families. Thus the model is 
consistent with the introduction of social security during the demographic transition, when retiree 
shares and survival rates increased while family size decreased. 
  Note that the equilibrium tax rate τ *( 1
1+m) is increasing as m decreases. Hence a social 
security system backed by size m=1 families has a higher tax rate than a social security system 
supported by size m>>1 families. This suggests that the historical growth of social security may be 
related to the historical trend towards smaller families and not (only) to the aging process per se. 
 
Example #2 [General distribution]  
The assumption in Example 1 of a common family size for all worker-and-retiree families is clearly 
restrictive. Consider now the same setting, but with a distribution over the number of family bonds. 
Let πm be the fraction of retirees with m links, with m ranging from zero to some maximum value M. 
Let  m  be the average number of family bonds per retiree. Note that, analogous to Example 1, 12 
m ≤ (1−η )/ˆ  η = πR(1−η )/η , and that social security requires less than 50% population share of 
workers-only families, 1−η − m ⋅η <1/2.  
  Among families with retirees, those with η =1/(1+ m) >η  (which always includes m=1) will 
prefer τ *(η) > 0. Families with 1/(1+ m) <η  prefer τ *(η) = 0. Support for social security is thus 
concentrated among relatively small families with a retiree, whereas larger families would be better off 
supporting their retiree privately. Let   
(  m = (1−η )/η  ⎣ ⎦denote the highest m-value for which families 





(  m 
∑ (1+ m)⋅η >1/2. (2) 
  Condition (2) ensures that families with retiree and up to   
(  m  workers constitute a majority. 
Unless the jump from (1−η )/η  to the next lower integer exceeds (1−η )/η − m , the   
(  m  exceeds m . 
If (2) is satisfied, let    m*∈ {1,..., (  m  }be the lowest integer for which  πm
m=0
m*
∑ (1+ m)⋅η >1/2. Then the 
equilibrium tax rate is τ *( 1
1+m*) and it is decreasing in m*.  
  For a quantitative illustration, consider again η =0.3, which implies   
(  m = 2. Condition (2) 
then specializes to Σ0 = 0.3⋅π0 + 0.6⋅π1 + 0.9⋅π2 > 0.5. Sufficient conditions are π2 > 5/9, or 
π1 > 5/6, or a linear combination where any gap between π2 and 5/9 is covered by sufficient π1 and 
π0 values. The median voter’s family size is m*=1 if 0.3⋅π0 + 0.6⋅π1 > 0.5, which means that π1 
plus half of π0 must exceed 5/6; otherwise m*= 2.  
  Note that families with    m > (  m  vote against social security. The model is thus consistent with 
the absence of social security systems in societies with many large families. The least supportive 
environment for social security would be a combination of disconnected retirees (m=0) and families of 
size    m = M = (  m +1. This scenario would maximize the number of retirees in families that vote for no 
taxes. Only the fraction π0 of retirees would support social security. 
  Retiree-only families do help to satisfy condition (2), but because the weight on π0 is less than 
½, their support is insufficient. Families ties between retirees and a small but positive number of 
workers are therefore central to generating voting support for social security.  
                                                      
11 To cover cases with   
(  m > M, formally define πm=0 for m>M.  13 
 
  Examples 1-2 do not allow for family bonds between retirees. Given the institution of 
marriage, this is restrictive. Turning to family structures with multiple retirees, key questions are how 
the number of working-age members grows with the number of retired members, and to what extent 
the death of a retiree breaks linkages between surviving retirees and working-age members. In some 
cases, one may suspect multiple bonds that survive the death of one retiree (e.g., married retirees with 
common children), whereas in other cases each retiree may contribute a separate set of 
intergenerational bonds. If marriage correlates with children or otherwise helps to coordinate voting 
among a larger number of members, two-retiree families may even have more than twice the number 
of family bonds than one-retiree families.  
 
Example #3 [Multiple retirees] 
Consider the same setting as in Example 2, but allow for families with two retirees. (A larger number 
could be modeled along the same lines, but the case of one- and two-retiree families suffices to 
illustrate the new issues.) Suppose a fraction μ of prospective retirees establishes, during working-age, 
a family bond with a same-age partner—labeled marriage for brevity—plus up to M bonds to younger 
members who will be working-age when the senior members are retired, i.e., intergenerational bonds. 
A fraction 1-μ is never married and forms m intergenerational bonds with probability πm, as in 
Example 2. Assume survival into retirement is independent of a partner’s survival. Then a fraction 
μ⋅πR
2 ⋅ ˆ  η =μ⋅πR ⋅η  of the population are married retirees, a fraction μ⋅(1−πR)⋅η  are widowed 
retirees, and (1−μ)⋅η  are never-married retirees.  
  Social security is again supported by families with retirees and with not too many working-age 
members. Let   
(  m = (1−η )/η  ⎣ ⎦ and   
(  m  2 = 2(1−η )/η  ⎣ ⎦ denote the highest m-values for which one- 
and two-retiree families support social security, respectively. If   
(  m  2 is even,   
(  m  2 =2 (  m , otherwise 
  
(  m  2 = 2 (  m +1. A voting equilibrium has positive social security taxes if single-retiree families with 
   m ≤ (  m  plus two-retiree families with    m ≤ (  m  2 constitute a majority.  14 
  As benchmark, suppose intergenerational bonds in two-retiree families are additive in the 
sense that each partner contributes bonds according to the distribution πm and that these links are 
broken when the contributing partner dies. Then intergenerational bonds in two-retiree families are 
distributed  π2,m = πi i=min(m,M )
max(m,M ) ∑ πm−i for m ≤2M, the distribution of the sum. The condition for 





(  m 
∑ (1+ m)⋅[1−μ+μ(1−πR)]η + π2,m
m=0
(  m  2
∑ (1+ m/2)⋅μπRη >1/2. (3) 
Compared to Example 2, one finds  
 
  
Σ1 =Σ 0 + π2,m
m=0
(  m  2
∑ (1+ m/2)− πm
m=0








⋅μπRη . (4) 
  Note that children per retiree in two-retiree families have a distribution with the same mean 
m as one-retiree families, but with only half the variance. Recall that the cutoff   
(  m  tends to be above 
the mean. This suggests that the fraction of two-retiree families with    m ≤ (  m  2 will exceed the fraction 
of one-retiree families with    m ≤ (  m , and thus marriage increases the support for social security. This 
intuition does not always apply, however, because voting support is lost whenever a retiree with 
   m ≤ (  m  is paired with a retiree who contributes more than   
(  m  2 − m additional intergenerational bonds. 
  For a quantitative illustration, suppose η =0.3, which implies   
(  m = 2 and   
(  m  2 = 4. In 
addition, assume μ = πR = 0.7 so 49% of retirees are surviving married and 21% widowed.12 For the 
distribution π0=.4 and π1= π2=.30, one finds Σ1=Σ0=0.57. Marriage does not affect voting outcomes. 
(One can show that this irrelevance applies in general whenever   
(  m ≥ M.) For π0=.35, π1= π2=.30, and 
π3=.05, Σ1=0.5675 exceeds Σ0=0.5555, so voter support is increased. While the support condition m≤2 
fails for 5% of one-retiree families, condition m≤4 fails for only 3.25% of two-retiree families. For 
π0=.35, π1= π2=.30, and π5=.05, in contrast, Σ1=0.5414 is less than Σ0=0.5555, so voter support is 
decreased. This is because families with m=5 will voter against social security even with two retirees.  
  Different assumptions about two-retiree families yield similarly mixed results. For example, 
suppose marriage does not add intergenerational bonds but creates linkages that survive the other 
                                                      
12 Note that because μ and πR only determine the weight on the bracket expression in (4) and not the sign of Σ1-Σ0, they do 
not matter for the key question if multiple-retiree families retiree partnerships increases or reduces voter support; also note 
that  μ and πR enter only through their product. The key issue is thus the distribution of family bonds—the shapes of πm and 
π2m and their interaction. 15 
retiree’s death. Then the distribution πm applies to all families with retirees, and the condition for 





(  m 
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Compared to the previous cases, one finds  
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In this case, marriage turns families with    m ∈ [ (  m +1, (  m  2] workers into social security supporters. But 
in families with    m ∈ [1, (  m  ] workers, where one retiree would have been enough to gain the workers’ 
support, a second retiree may represent a lost opportunity to form a separate family that includes 
additional workers. The net effect can be positive or negative, depending on how much support is 
gained for    m ∈ [ (  m +1, (  m  2] versus support lost for    m ∈ [1, (  m  ].13  
  Overall, Example 3 suggests that multi-retiree families complicate the analysis without 
necessarily affecting the results in either direction.  
  Figure 1 plots the cutoff values   
(  m  and   
(  m  2 against the retiree share η . Two specific scenarios 
may be instructive, one for the U.S., the other for continental Europe. First, suppose η  is equal or 
slightly below 0.2, the relevant range for the U.S. Then families with one retiree and up to 4 working-
age members plus families with two retirees and up to 8 working-age members will support social 
security. It seems plausible that these conditions cover the vast majority of American families—all but 
very large extended families. Second, suppose η  is around 0.3, the relevant range in continental 
European countries. Then families with one retiree and up to two working-age members, plus families 
with 2 retirees and up to 4 working-age members, will support social security. Because families with 
more than two children have become rare in Europe, and because even families with two retirees, two 
children, and two grandchildren would also satisfy these conditions, the conditions are plausibly 
satisfied in European countries, too. 
                                                      
13 For example, consider again π0=.4, π1= π2=.30, and π3=.05, with the same other assumptions as above. Then Σ2=0.5072 is 
less than Σ0 and Σ1, but still above 50%. 16 
6. Conclusions 
The paper provides conditions for pay-as-you-go benefits to retirees to be supported as a voting 
equilibrium in a static model. The key requirement is that a sufficient fraction of retirees are in 
families with a positive, but not excessively large number of working-age members. Then the median 
voter lives in a family with above-average retiree share. Numerical examples suggest that this 
condition is satisfied in Europe and in the United States.  
  The paper’s focus on static family bargaining is not to dispute the relevance of other voting 
arguments. It would straightforward, for example, to make labor productivity heterogeneous and to 
show that a skewed wage distribution would increase voter support for public pensions with 
progressive benefits. The model is also potentially complementary to dynamic models; many such 
models rely on trigger strategies that (arbitrarily) select one of many equilibrium paths that could have 
been supported by alternative beliefs about voting in the future. The static argument for social security 
provides a natural lower bound for expectations about future benefits.  
  Overall, the mechanism proposed here helps to explain the remarkable popularity of public 
retirement and retiree health care programs. This is important because understanding the popularity of 
such programs is arguably a pre-condition for designing politically feasible reforms. 
 17 
References 
Aaron, H.J., 1966. The Social Insurance Paradox, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science 32, 371-376. 
Bohn, Henning, 1999. Will Social Security and Medicare Remain Viable as the U.S. Population is 
Aging? Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 50, 1-53. 
________, 2005. Will Social Security and Medicare Remain Viable as the U.S. Population is Aging? 
An Update. In: Robin Brooks and Assaf Razin (eds.), The Politics and Finance of Social Security 
Reform, Cambridge University Press, 44-72. 
Breyer, Friedrich and J-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg, 1987. Voting on Social Security: The Family 
as Decision-Making Unit. Kyklos 40(4), 529-547. 
Browning, E.K. (1975). Why the Social Insurance Budget is too large in a Democratic Society. 
Economic Inquiry 13, 373-388. 
Cooley, Thomas, and Jorge Soarez, 1999. A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation, 
Journal of Political Economy 107, 135-160. 
Galasso, Vincenzo, 2006. The Political Future of Social Security in Aging Societies. MIT Press.  




Table 1: Conditions for Social Security in Example 1 
 
Retiree 
Share (η ) 
Survival Prob. 
(πR) 








bound  Integer m  Lower bound 
0.10  0.44 4.0  9.0  5  0.80 
       6  0.67 
       7  0.57 
       8  0.50 
       9  0.44 
0.15  0.41 2.3  5.7  3  0.78 
       4  0.58 
       5  0.47 
0.20  0.38 1.5  4.0  2  0.75 
       3  0.50 
       4  0.38 
0.25  0.33 1.0  3.0  2  0.50 
       3  0.33 
0.30  0.29 0.7  2.3  1  0.67 
       2  0.33 
0.35  0.23 0.4  1.9  1  0.43 
0.40  0.17 0.3  1.5  1  0.25 
0.45  0.09 0.1  1.2  1  0.11 
  
Figure 1: Maximum number of working-age members for families with one and two 
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